The main results of our indirect evolutionary app roach to trust in large interactions suggest that trustworthiness must be detectable if good conduct in t rustrelationships is to survive. According to theoretical reasoning there is a niche then for an organization affering a (possibly) costly service of keeping track of the conduct of participants on the net. We compare traits of an organizational design as suggested by economic reasoning with those that actually emerged and ask whether institutions like eBay will increasingly have to 'economize on virtue' although so far they could rely on its spontaneaus provision.
Introduction and Overview
Order c a n em er ge sponta n eously if an inte raction is r epeated a nd such mech anisms as r eput a tion format ion can run their course . Platforms like e Bay t h a t organize social coop eration over the Internet a re a case in p oint . They p rodu ce 'order without law' (see Ellikson 1991) or without commanding t h e fu ndam ental coercive powers t o raise taxes, t o collec t information and to punish misbehav ior but d efinitely not without incurring costs. Ther efore we must ask why indiv idua ls a r e willing to bear the costs of or ganizing social coop eration over the Internet, why othe rs a re willing t o pay them for rendering such organ izational serv ices as there a re a nd wh a t the prospects for the survival and development of service provider s are.
Addressing su ch questions in a somewh a t indirect way we will first sket ch (2 .) som e results of our former work that show tha t even in large (almost) anony ma us inte raction s as today prevailing on the Internet trustworthiness can s urv ive if it can b e det ected with som e reliability. This contra dict s some com mon views to the effect that 'large' interaction s cannot conceivably be organized wit hout the fundamental coercive p ower of the st ate a nd therefore could in particular n ot persist on the interna tion a l level w her e a common state organ ization is lacking. It, h owever , presupposes tha t individuals h ave ch a racteristics tha t as a matter of fact restriet the ir opportunistic choice making in ways a kin t o boundedly r ational b eh avior. In t h e next section (3.) we lay out some 'economists" ideas concerning desirable or likely properties of a n et platform-Big Brother or BB-for organizing bilateral exch a nges. Comparing this re fere nce m od el with eB ay is instru ctive since it sh ows that eBay ch ose a raute r elying more stron gly on community feel-ings and intrinsic motivation than on extrinsic incentives like reputation scores as suggested by 'more economic' approaches to human behavior (4. ). Start ing from the cantrast between eBay and BB we raise additional questions, indica te possible lines of future research, and finally issue a cautionary remark on the scope and limits of eBay as a platform of trade (5.).
The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Trust m Large
Transactions' Systems
The Basic Trust Problem and its Representation as a Simple Game
Imagine a situation in which there are so many potential interaction partners for bi-lateral transactions that in repeated interaction none of t hem can keep track of the actions of all others. The behavior of each of the actors directly and significantly affects her or his partner but is individually insignificant for the collective result. We refer to such a transactions' system as a large transactions' system. Given this definition it is obvious in pa rticular that wheth er or n ot ther e is a 'climate of trust' in a large transactions' syst em is n ot a m att er to b e influen ced strategically by individual actions. Individu al actions affect the partner of a transaction only. The overall 'trust climate' characterizing the ongoing inte raction is the result of all the indiv idual actions but n one of the indiv idual acts is significantly resp onsible for the collective result. Interaction p a rtners are concerned with the r esults of the par ticu lar interactions in which they participate. They are also interested in their own r eputation.
If there is a reputa tion effect they will take it into account. B u t as far as there is no r eputation effect what m ay b e called the 'trust pred icamen t' emerges: every participa nt of interactions taking place in a large transactions' system can act opportunistically b ehind the veil of individual insignificance. In pursuit of t h eir common interest b oth actors can a nd in view of their extrinsic p rofit m otives sh ould always deviate from agr eem ents a nd go fo r their private interest. When en gaging a n interaction with a partner b oth individuals exp ect to be better off if b oth act as agreed. However, each knows that showing t rust in mov ing first is risky b ecause the second mover can exploit the first moving actor's t rust . The mutually adva ntageaus d ealswill not be realized if the act or in the first mover role does n ot trust or the act or in the second mover role does not r eward trust. The lack of trust or the presence of the risk of exploita tion can thus sta n d in the way of w hat is in the b est interest of the actors.
The following graph presents a ra tional choice explicat ion of t h e t rust pr edicame nt in unila ter al trust problems (the p rison er 's dile mma or exchange being the paradigm example of bilateral trust problems):
Player i st a rts by deciding between N(o-trust) and T(r ust) . After N the game ends with player i earning s and player j earning 0. After T t h e game continues with j 's choice b etween E(xploita tion) a nd R (eward ) . 
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One could imagine that the game of figure 1 would be represented once with object.ive POO"'ffis and once with subjective pa;yoffis. Rather than using two garre representat.ions we use only one with the understanding that the parameter m is a purel:y subject.ive one. There is no objective pa;yoff corresponding to the paramoter m while all the other paramoters represent object.ive a:nd subjective pa;yoffis at the sarre time. Since there are sufficient degrees of lreedom the subjecti-.e ut.ilit:y functions can be chosen such that the numerical val ues of the object.ive and the subject.ive pa;yoffis coincide.
II we set the pararreter m=O then a garre errerges in which onl:y object.ive pa;yoffis matter as (extrinsic) motivation of individual actions. The secend nDver in this game is not (intrinsically) nDtivated b;y the desire to act in trust.worth;y ways. Such an actor Iacks intrinsic nDtivation since his actions are guided br nothing but expected object.ive POO"'ffis or extrinsic mot.ives. Once the paramoter m becomes positive or negative it represents some fOrm of intrinsic tmtiva.tion. We neglect negative val ues of m represent.ing nDtives like spite and !Oe us on positive values a:nd thus on the range of parameters that conceivably might further co-operation. The intrinsic mot.ivat.ion to co-operaie is sufficient to inlluence choice onl:y if the parameter m becomes !arge enough, i.e. 1 -m < r or m > 1-r(> 0) otherwise it a.ffects morel:y the (subjective) POO"'ff without being behaviora.ll:y relevant. II the nDtivat.ion to act honestJ:y is st.rong enough then exploitat.ion in the secend mo-.er roJe will be avoided. However, this will further cooperat.ion onl:y if it can be known b:y the first nDver. The first. mover will trust. onl:y if he knows that the secend mover is mot.ivated to act fa.irl:y--or at least he must. expect with sufficient probabilit:y that the secend mover is trustworth;y. Quite obviousl:y, actors w ho manage to show trust. and to receive the reward !Or trust in the first. nDver roJe will be better off than those who do not trust or are exploited. Likewise the trustworthy individuals who are recognized as such will be trusted and do better tha n the untrustworthy if otherwise no trust will be shown-this will apply at least under suitable conditions.
Basic Ideas of Iudireet Evolution
We studied the basic game of figure 1 quite extensively wit hin t h e framework of an indirect evolutionary approach (Güth/Kliemt 1994 Güt h / Kliemt / B rennan 2003; Güth/ Kliemt / Peleg 2000) . In this approach rational choices t h at are made by a rational forward looking actor in view of his ' subjective expectations' or 'subjective p ayoffs' a re embedded in a n evolutionary process which fixes success of decision determinants in terms of 'objective' payoffs t h at are brought about by the choices. The duality of subjective p ayoffs guiding behavior and objective payoffs determining success is at root of the indir ec t evolutionary approach in general a nd of the corresponding account of ' t r ustwor t h iness' in particular.
As an illustration it may be helpful to think of the evolutionary model of firm competition and innova tion that has been suggested by Armen Alchian a long time ago (see Alchian 1950) . In t his seminal p aper it is argued that under suitable competitive conditions the m ore profitable fir ms will drive out the less profitable ones regardless of whet he r or n ot those who are running t h e firms are consciously aiming at profit maximization. The subjective aims as r epresented by the subj ective utility function of the staff of a firm may be almost a n yth ing. For insta nce the staff might aim at 'providing the customer with t he best quality' available, 'furthering the common weal', ' maximizing market share', 'having an adequ ate share of the market' or whatever. If a str ategy is as a matt er of fact objectively profitable then firms that adopt it w ill survive and otherwise n ot. Survival is de termined by objective success of choices and t h us independen tly of the subjective motives leading to the ch oices. Firms that pursue for wh at reasons ever strategies that lead to losses will eventually be elimina t ed from the game. As Alchian argued, even if initial strategies would be assigned completely randomly to firms, in the end those firms su rvive that a r e endowed by chance w ith a successful strategy. This w ill h old good as long as there is a gr owt h, b irth and, decline as well as death mechanism t hat will let t h e objectively m ore successful flourish a nd the oth ers n ot.
Alchia n knew Darwinian arguments-that had a long tradition in social t heory a nyway-very well. But h e wrote before more precise concepts of evolutionary game theor y like tha t of a n evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) were developed. Later results t ha t rely on such con cepts show, t hat once profit maximizing strategies a r e esta blish ed (as a monomorphic population ) oth er stra t egies cannot invade su ch a population a nymore. The result is evolutionarily stable if interac tion forms a competitive market where n o seller's p rofit depends on another seller's b eh avior (see Güth/ P eleg 2001) .
Real world examples of objectively successful strategies t hat are not meant to be p rofit maximizing might form those (in particular Germ an and Japanese) companies run by engineers that were pursuing a 'quality firs t stra tegy'. The strategy was economically doubtful and often seemed fo olish in t he short perspective but obviously was selected by market forces as t he objectively p rofit maximizing strategy over the long haul. Even though the heads of companies were acting against maximization of subjectively perceived profits, what they did for other reasons was sufficient to be ahead of the average performance of the market as measured in 'true' or objective profits.
lndirect Evolution in Large Groups
The indirect evolutionary approach to the evolution of trust in large gr oups (on small interactions see Güth et al. 2002) considers basically two second mover strategies for the game represented in figure 1. For t he first strategy the parameter m is sufficiently large to affect behavior. The indiv idual actor is endowed with an intrinsic motive that is strong enough to m ake her behave in trustworthy ways. This makes her a trustworthy actor. She is not only strategically behaving as if she were one but is making strategy choices because she is trustworthy. For the second strategy the parameter m is n ot lar ge enough to affect behavior. The individual actor is not endowed w ith a sufficiently strong intrinsic motive such as to induce her to reward the trusting initial move of the first mover. She is not trustworthy and ther efore will not beh ave in t rustworthy ways unless there is a strategic extrinsic m otive to do so.
Social theorists almost across the b oard have uttered skep ticism about survival prospects of such forms of good conduct as 'trustworthiness'. ' The elicitation of good conduct' (see Klein 1997 ) in large grou ps seems to b e ruled ou t by the conditions of large scale social interaction. They were even m or e skeptical when it came to the survival prospects of genuine trustworthiness or the intrinsic motivation to behave in trustworthy ways. P eople would beh ave as if trustworthy for strategic reasons for instance in an effor t t o maintain t heir good reputation in repeated interactions but ther e would n ot b e the genuine 'th ing' (though even in Kreps e t al. 1982 the genuine thing a nd t h e 'crazy' belief in it s presence are n eeded to induce oth ers to behave as if trustworthy). Relating t his to the preceding discussion in gene ral a nd in particular to the concept of a large transactions' syst em as introduced b efore the issue to b e addressed is wheth er or not trustworthy individuals can survive in large transactions' systems: Are ther e and if so what a re the conditions under w hich trustwor t hy indiv iduals will fa re well enough to avoid extinction?
1 A Simple Model of Large Transactions ' Systems
To model a large transactions' system we ma ke some assumptions about the scope a nd kind of the inter action (for formal d erivations u nderly ing t h e following discussion see for inst a nce Güth / Kliemt 1994; : Imagine infinitely many rounds of play of infinitely ma ny indiv iduals (representing a very large group inte racting under conditions of indiv idual insignifica nce) . Let t h e individuals b e match ed ra ndomly t o play the gam e of trust of figure 1. Half of the time t h ey end up in the first a nd h alf of the time they end up in t he second m over role. Some of the indiv iduals m ay b e trustworthy in the second mover role. After each round of play objective relative success fixes the population composition on the next round of play. Whether the choice of trust is m ore advantageaus than showing no trust depends on the population composition, i.e. on t he presen ce of trustworthiness. As long as sufficiently many trustworthy individuals are arou nd the payoff expectation of showing trust can be higher t han that of showing no trust even without the possibility of screening. Therefore it is wor t hwhile to incur the risk of showing trust and rational individuals will show trust in the first mover role. If undetected, untrustworthy individuals can exploit firs t mov er trust, h owever. As long as objective success on each round of play determines how many players of each type will be present on the next round of pla y relatively higher success of the untrustworthy will drive out the trustworthy until a lower threshold of the population share of the trustworthy is reach ed from which on it will not be advantageaus to trust. This holds good under allplausible dy namics which correlate higher objective payoff with higher population share. Once t here are not sufficiently many trustworthy individuals around to m ake it worthwhile to incur the risk of showing trust no first mover will ever deliberately choose to show trust. However, as long as trust is chosen by mistake occasionally, the untrustworthy will once in a while be presented with the opportunity to exploit a trusting first mover. They will then fare better than t h e t rust worthy and fare equally well as the trustworthy in all other instances w h en no trust is shown. In this mistake driven process the trustworthy will still b e eliminated over the long haul though much more slowly than in the case of ration al trust.
Whether the trustworthy or those who are not trustworth y succeed m ore gen erally depends on whether or n ot trustworthiness can b e de tect ed by p ot ential first movers. If first movers can trust the trustworthy and avoid t rusting t h ose who do not deserve to b e trusted the trustworthy individuals w ill flourish. If the abilities to discriminate between t ypes are p erfect then only trustwort hy types can conceivably survive. The reasoning is obvious: t h e t r ustworthy w ill b e trusted a nd therefore receive a higher objective payoff t h an t h e untrustworthy in each and every transaction in which they t a ke pa rt. The untrustwor t hy w ill not be trusted a nd therefor e fa r e less well than the trustworthy. They never will find a chance to exploit first mover trust. Going to t h e obvious opposite extreme in which alltype discrimination skills a re lacking a nd type informat ion is complet ely private the untrustworthy will fa re b etter if trusted a nd fare as w ell as the trustworthy if nobody ever trusts. In tha t case the trustworthy will go extinct if only slowly so beyond the thresh old from which on trust will be sh own only by mista ke.
Enriching the M odel by a Costly Detection Technology
The mo del b ecomes rich er if we allow screening to be cost ly. Consider wh at may b e called a ' costly d et ection technology of limited reliability' or a 'detection technology' for short. Such a de tection t echnology provides a signal to t he actor in the first mov er role. Those who p a y the price for using the technology can thereby know with higher proba bility w hether the partner in the second mover role is a trustworthy or a n untrustworthy t ype. Whether investing t h e price or incurring the costs is worthwhile, of course, depends on the reliability of the technology and the type composition of the population. If ahnost all individuals are trustworthy or if almost all individuals are untrustworthy, it will not pay to invest in screening.
This and some additional insights are, in a way, summed up by figure 2 which shows the population share p of the trustworthy on the horizontal and the cost C for type detection on the vertical axis. If the reliability of the technology is very lowthen the realm in which it is advantageaus to rely on it will be small. In figure 2 the triangle would shrink by lowering its top corner C" while the two other corners on the horizontal axis might be approaching s. If the costs are higher the use of the technology will be advantageaus for fewer population compositions. Whenever the population composition para:meter p falls for some C' into the interval (1r, IT), whose boundaries 1r and IT vary with C', the population share of trustworthy individuals will grow due to the availability ofscreening (after costly investment in type detection). For given C' the population share of trustworthy individuals will shrink outside that interval, i.e. for p < 1f or p > rr where no type information is bought. c c The more reliable the detection technology the higher its costs can be without preventing its use. If the detection technology works with perfect reliability and its costs are zero then, as previously indicated, the full interval [0, 1] of initial population compositions will lead to a population of trustworthy individuals only. The solid arrows show dynamics that are driven by deliberate choices while the dashed arrows show dynamics that are merely mistake driven. For C > C" there is only one evolutionarily stable type composition, namely p*=O, resp. the m < 1-r-monomorphism, whereas for C=O a nd perfect reliability of screening only p*= 1, resp. the m > 1-r-monomorphism is st able. In all other cases (i.e. for 0 < C' < C" or C = O with unreliable detection) there a r e two evolutionarily stable population compositions p, namely p*=O and p*=p( C ).
Figure 2 also illustrates the basins of attraction of these two: whenever the initial composition Po satisfies Po < 7r, the population composition p converges to p*=O whereas for p 0 > 7r it will converge to p*=p( C)--either by a n increase of p if Po < p(C) or a decrease of p if Po > p(C).
Relating Results to eBay
To relate the findings of the indirect evolutionary approach to t rust in large interactions' systems to eBay it may be helpful to sum up some gen eral insights of the previous discussion first. If type disc rimination is sufficiently inexpensive a nd sufficiently reliable then:
• there is a niche in which trustworthiness can surv ive in evolut ionarily st able ways;
• there is a niche for those providing at reasonable costs t he d etection technology or orga nizing an interaction 'platform' on which t rustworthiness may surv1ve;
• if d etection is imperfect a nd/ or de tection costs are posit ive t hen a su fficient degree of trustworthiness must b e initially present t o stabilize its presence e ndogenously (there will always b e a nich e for some untrust worthy indiv iduals but the trustworthy can survive only if there is initially a su fficient number of them).
For successful Internet auction platforms like eBay, this suggests t h e following conclusions:
• the founder s of eBay were lucky in the sense that initially the situation p 0 > 7r (see figure 2) prevailed;
• the rela tive carelessness of behavior when tra nsacting over t h e n et seems t o su ggest tha t p a rticipa nts p e rceive the population share of t rust worthy indiv iduals as p > II and therefore in general do n ot incur (idiosyncr a tic) costs of t y p e detection;
• n o efforts a t Scr eening w ill b e worthwhile as long as the perc eption of p > II prevails a nd ther efor e the sh a re p of trustwort hiness on t h e Inte rnet will tend to d ecline a n d cha n ces fo r as well as instances of fraud will t end to increase.
Without any doubt eBay is a great success. Its market ca pitalization is remarkable. It is a company going increasingly international a n d it m ight ev en seem to be a first step towards a global market in which individu als transact increasingly across borders without specialized intermediaries. T he Internet is ther eby bringing about what may be called spontaneaus globalization, not only of information but also of transactions. Nevertheless, in view of t he preca rious n ature of a general climate of trust in large transactions' syst ems it is by no m eans a sure thing that eBay will survive. Interpreted in terms of our general model eBay could work rather well as long as p > II and people were showing trust. Unless the general climate of trust and trustworthiness be eroded the share p of trustwor t hy individuals must be protected. The safeguard provided by eBay is its reputation mech anism. However, from a rational choice point of view the reputat ion feed back mech anism of eBay is rather peculiar. The exclusion from interaction t h at wou ld drive the efficacy of reputation mechanisms in other contexts d oes n ot pla y a cent r al role for eBay. Without possibilities of proper verification of iden tity a trader in eBay cannot be detected if switching to a new identity. Moreover, the mech anism of building up a ' good' re putation is not cheat proof either. Repu tations may b e built up strategically for exploitation purposes. Wha t m ay b e called ' eBay brand names' can b e trad ed. So, how to prevent go od r eputations b eing bough t u p by b ad guys? True enough, the higher the p remium that is carried by p ositive reputa tion on the n et (but there is not too much evidence for tha t a nyway) the mor e costly it would b ecome t o send a false signal by buying into a good reputa tion or by w illing to ' burn' a good on e for the 'big k ill' . Still, cost s wou ld n ot preclude all forms of such fra ud a mong st rat egically ration al t raders who seek a nd might find w ays to exploit market platforms like eBay a nd t he bigger a nd the more global tra n sactions b ecome the highe r the risks. We subm it t h at eBay will hav e to cha n ge its ch a racter a nd b ecom e more 'knave pr oof' in the process.
The Example of Big Brother
With the preceding results on the 'evolutiona ry nich e for t rust wort hiness' in h and let us imagine a n institution that may b e called big brother. Let us think of ' BB' as p roviding a n et platform a nd the essential informa tion on the t r ustwor t h iness of p otential t ransaction pa r t n ers tha t might get into contact t h rou gh use of tha t platform. In v iew of the a na r chic cha racter of the n et BB is lacking t hat funda m ental coercive p ower t h at goes alon g with the mod ern st ate. In particular BB cannot ch eck wh ether information whisp e red into his ears is t ru e or not. At least h e h as n o indep ende nt coercive m eans of finding out t h e truth. BB must r ely on wh a tever h e is told and t ry to distill from t h is som e mor e r eliable information. Can such a powerless BB implem ent a useful yet cost ly detection technology a nd get p aid for it if h e mer ely prudently comp ares information from diffe rent sources? Asking t his question is, in a way, asking for something a kin t o eBay. But let us stay a bit with BB. BB stands more or less for an economist 's 'natural way' to set up a large transactions' system that can facilitate exchange and r eputation formation over the Internet. Obviously a typical economist should b e expected to operate unde r the assumption tha t " ... people would act economically; when an opportunity of an advantagewas presented t o them they would take it" (Hicks 1979, 43) . But restless maximization a nd t a king of all oppor tunities is per haps too far removed from real world behavior to be taken seriously. Some fo rm of merely boundedly ra tional opportunity taking behavior must, however, clearly be ta ken into account. Even if not all people ta ke all opportunities all the time some will do. Presumably in an environment like eBay t hey will d o so r ath er frequently a nd w ith relative impunity. Since an economist wou ld a nticipate t h a t this might undermine the whole tra nsaction system we wou ld expect BB to be set up in a way that prevents such problems as well as possible.
Obviously it is c rucial that we specify wh a t BB would do wit h t he information that he might acquire. The simplest way and a m ethod t hat comes to on e's mind immediately is a check on consistency of reports. Lacking fundam ental coercive power and without any backing by su ch power t h rough sta t e en forced legal institutions t his may be almost all BB might be able to do. In forming a reputa tion for arbitrary indiv iduals i, j tha t have enlisted as potential transaction partners BB cannot do much more than comparing what t h e two p a rtners i, j tell him, i. e. by checking w hether both parties con ceive of a deal as prop erly completed. Counting the numbers of transactions and to r elate t hem t o the number of good, bad, consistent or inconsistent repor ts seems m ore or less all BB can do. To see m ore specifically wh at may go on h er e, let us for all i and all times t call t he following vector a 'counting typ e':
h ct = m 1 , n 1 , m 2 , n 2 , w ere mi is the number of participa tions as seller in successful t ransactions, ni is the numbe r of participations as selle r in transactions, m~ is the numbe r of participations as buyer in successful t ra n sactions, n~ is the number of participations as b uye r in transactions.
How a counting type develops t hrough time depends on how the counting is clone. It seems reasonable to assume that in all cases in which both participants in a tra nsaction report the sam e result, counting would just follow the reports. W h enever participants reported d ifferently BB can either count t h e transaction as unsuccessful, successful or count it n ot at all. BB must make a strategic decision h ere. A s a most simple yet p lausible m ech a nism imagine t h e following:
• Initially all counting-types of all ind iv iduals i a re cb = (mi,ni,m~, n~) = (0, 0, 0, 0) .
• BB asks i a nd j to report simultaneously and reduces the reputation of non-reporters i, by increasing ni or n~ but n either mi norm~; counts according to report if i and j report t h e same result, i.e. r(i)=r(j); increases ni or n~ but neither mi nor m~, for b oth if r (i)~r(j), unless one of the self-reports is unfavora ble leading to n o alteration of cou nt for any party (in tha t case both were presuma bly h onest and a mistake occurred preventing successful completion of t h e interaction ) .
BB d oes not command the power to ta.x. But BB cannot p rov ide h is services for free either. He must get paid for his services. Therefor e to act reason ably, BB should keep all reputa tion informa tion strictly to himself-or so it seems. He would offer information on the trustworthiness of a potential t ransaction par t ner only when asked and he would answer only if a fee for service would be paid. BB as conceived in our thought experiment would continue his dealings wit h customers only if those customers were willing to ident ify t h em selves cr edibly and would report the results of transactions to him. As far as t his is concerned BB would and could require positive proof. (The latter features are clearly different from eBay.)
In 1996 a study group a t the University of Duisburg (Stefa n D reckmann, a programmer, Markus Grune r, a simulation expert from physics, and Hartmut Kliemt) simulated a club-like large transactions' system run b y BB. A s suggest ed by the former results on the evolutionary niche for trustworthiness we st a rted with quite a high proportion of trustworthy and truthful individ uals. These individuals would b e trustwort hy in second m over roles. Bein g intrinsically motivated 'to do the right thing' t hey would truthfully report t h e results of transactions to BB and thereby give BB access to correct inform ation depending on the numbe r of intrinsically m otivat ed t ypes a roun d . Concernin g t h e oth er simulated indiv iduals we allowed for arbitrary strategies of cheating and lying tha t could p ossibly c rowd the trustworthy and truthful out of t he p op ulat ion and scrutinized wheth er or not these strategies would b e mor e successful than those of individuals showing good conduct.
BB r elied on counting t ypes trying to extract information from the r eports he got a nd updating the t ypes accordingly then informing p otential customers ab out the trustworthiness of potential transaction partners on condition of a feed back re p ort a nd a modest fee (counting n on-feedback as cheating) . According to simulations with more t h a n 50 per cent of trustworthy and t rut hful ind ividuals in the p opula tion good conduct would drive out bad conduct . Since t h e objective success of strategies on each round of play wou ld fix t he prop or tia ns of trustworthy a nd truthful individuals in the n ext generation the relatively m ore successful ind ividuals were present in t h e p opulation in ever h igher proportia ns after every round of p lay if sta rting w it h favor a ble initial conditions or an exogen ous supply of trustworthiness and truthfulness. To put it slightly ot herwise, st a rting out w ith sufficiently many trustworthy a nd truth ful individuals and sufficiently low costs a BB w ho could only check on consist en cy of r eports when updating his estima t es of the trust worthiness of the transaction part n ers cou ld make t h e t rustworthy a nd truthful fl.ourish. And BB cou ld d o so by m eans of a reputation mech anism only. Insufficient computing power (1996 is a long time back in computing) prevented to check on the long run stability of such results. Still, t he simulations d id at least indicate that even a powerless BB with very simple means of detecting the trustworthy and truthful might do the trick. This was and presumably still is interesting to some extent. However, BB did not turn in to eBay or something akin tothat great success. Even though some of us toyed wit h t h e idea of t r ying to exploit its potential, we would certainly have encountered a d isappointment. For in fact BB did not have the potential for success wh ile eBay did. It seems to us that eBay succeeded because it was less of an economist vision than BB. It was less concerned with cheating than BB would ever have been. BB appealed to interests, tried to build in checks on truth and hedged his inform at ion where eBay was trustful and openly appealing more t o community feelin gs of those transacting over the net on its platform. It could d o so since addressing originally only members of a single company it started in a kind of community environment. We speculate that it was triggering thereby a kind of co-operative heuristic in participants. When transcending the borders of the original 'community' additional transaction partners were taken into an already co-operative environment. Again certain h euristics recommending 'com mu nitarian' typ es of behavior must have thereby b een trigger ed. So the initial success of eBay p erhaps was possible only since it was not so much of a n economic inst itution as BB. Nevertheless the long run success may d ep end on eBay b ecoming more ' knave proof' or economic.
It seems worthwhile to illustrate such speculative r easoning som ewhat fur t h er by a short compa rison b e tween BB and eBay. We will t h en be in a position to address again the question of whether what was good for eBay initially w ill be good for it over the lon g haul or w hether eBay might have t o move somewhat closer to BB if it is to survive its own success on the several national a nd even global levels. In doing so we n eglect the p rob le ms that m ight arise for b oth eBay and BB if these pla tforms a r e--as seems to b e the case--used t o perform transactions in illegally acquired goods.
A Comparison of eBay and BB
In particular the fact that re putation informa tion is publicized on the net and t h er eby provided as a collective good to all m ember s of eBay seems to be sign ificant. Distributing r eputation informa tion freely facilita t es seeking out partners with certain re putation ch a racteristics. More gene rally speaking eBay is only in a much weaker sense a club than BB. In particula r lying about on e's identity is p ossible quite easily in eBay a nd h as been excluded in the env ironm ent c reated by BB. There is also n o incentive provided by eBay a t least n ot such a str ong one as in con ceivable BB env ironments to report the results of d ealings. Where BB would diminish the r eputation of those who arenot reporting the r esu lts of transactions, eBay does not d o any of t h e kind but r elies on an intrinsic m otivation to r eport. P eople must b e motiva ted to r eport and to do so truthfully. Her e as in oth er regards eBay seems at least implicitly t o app eal t o feelings of belonging to a 'community' and the like. To put it slightly ot herwise eBay seems to rely more on communitaria n trust and on retributive emotions t han com mercial platforms of the BB type as imagined in the corresp on din g economically motivated thought and simulation experiment.
Emotional trust is fragile in particular in a large transactions' system under conditions of individual insignificance. It m ay be tha t human indiv idu als who cannot really shift their behavioral gears will often act in t h e new environ ment of eBay as if p a rticipating in a small numbers' interaction. H owever , it seems doubtful that we can ' trust' in the prevalence of such a syst ematic error over the long run. Bea ring in mind the basic results of the indirect evolutionary approach to trust in large transactions' systems we must ask wh eth er or n ot eBay really can create evolutionarily stable co-operation in t h e following sense: Is type detection in eBay sufficiently reliable and cheap to preven t innovative untrustworthiness from crowding out trustworthy behavior? W ill n et plat form s have to acquire stronger club characteristics and have t o impose strict er r ules of admission in view of stra tegic reputation building (e.g . accumulating a r eputation for trustworthiness incrementally with small stakes while going for t he 'big kill' in a fraud eventually)?
BB must make strategic d ecisions wh en setting up his r ep ut a tion format ion algorithm as well as other rules of the game that h e provides. Likewise eBay must consider modification s of its rules if it inte nds to be pr ep ared for future challen ges to its viability as might emer ge rathe r soon (again increasing t rafficking in illegally ac quired commodities b eing a crucial issue). It is fruitful to bear in mind BB w hen addressing such issues for eBay.
Somebody who would n ot know anyt hing a b out eBay would certainly imagin e tha t a reasona ble BB would n ot disclose the full counting t ype to t h e part icipants for free. He would rathe r insist on giv ing aggrega te inform at ion on t r ustwor t h in ess as seller or buyer respectively a nd would disclose it only on demand and against payment. If BB discloses all information a nd p erhaps also allows the presentation of qualita tive information, e.g. qualitative assessm ents by t h e parties to a tra nsaction, then BB gives up control over how the inform ation is used a nd aggregated by custome rs. C ustom ers might like t hat in t he first place bu t it might undermine the viability of the platform since t h ere would n ot anymore b e clear reputa tion signals apply ing to all and fixed b y t he p latform provide rs . Now, compare that w it h eBay. eBay partly presents the reputation info rmation in aggrega te form. So it seems that it follows the same policy. But quite surprisingly yet also quite in line with its p olicy of b eing tra nsparen t eBay also allows to check the past t ra nsaction records of participa n ts. eBay p rovides m ore information than it needs to a nd than is used m ost of t h e time b y p a rticipan ts.
C learly t ransaction s can fail for reasons other tha n d eliber ate ch eating or d elibe rate exp loitation. Things may go wron g by ch ance. If we include t hat p ossibility then ther e sh ould b e som e tolera n ce in the formation of r ep utation. The unforgiv ing approach accord ing to which those who cheat ed once are 'out of the game' so to say might b e self-defeat ing . But forgiving strategies may b e subj ect to exploitation. For instance if p eople know how close t h ey are t o the thresh old beyond which t he y w ill b e trusted or not t rusted in a forgiving strat-egy they could respond to this informa tion strategically. The most dangerous transaction partners should then be those wh o have n ever ch eated befor e bu t might cheat without risking their reputation since the built in tolerance would protect them. On the oth er h a nd those who would fall below t h e t h reshold of acceptability as a trustworthy partner of interaction should t h ey fail to fulfill t h eir part of a specific bargain might be particula rly trustworthy or rather reliable fo r opportunistic reasons in that deal.
If the full counting ty pe were revealed, actors could t h emselves draw conclusions. Some actor s might b e unfo rgiv ing, others might be very forgiving still others might act in flexible ways responding t o additional information as might be available. As indica ted, specialized services judging t h e trustworth iness of participants might be expected to emerge as secondary organization s on such a platform. This may in one way improve the reputation mechanism but it may also reduce the financial basis of the platform and the willingness of t ransact ion partners to report-in particular if they have special counseling deals with secondary services. In view of this it does not seem to b e obvious that the st rategy of eBay to disclose more or less all informa tion t o all tra nsaction partners is the optimal one or even one that can sustain eBay over the long h aul. The issue is n ot merely w h ether or n ot eBay is sufficiently robust against increasingly pr ofessional efforts of cheating, it is also whether a n informal set up as of eBa y m ight not d estabilize its own basis by providing its services too freely a n d in w ays t h at invite secondary services to enter transactions. Secondary services already offered by eBay as costly d evices, b ut ra r ely used might act as 'trustees' who, for insta nce, gua ra ntee both paymen t a nd d elivery of items as promised and in a quality as promised. So-called 'p ick up p oints' (ty pically gas stations and the like) are used n owadays alread y t o facilitate Nettra nsactions of other providers. The goods are d elivered there and after insp ection paid typically in cash. Firms offering n ew goods offer to t estify t h e q uality of used products of their own brand tha t are m eant to go fo r sale on the n et etc. -This all may be helpful in containing risks of tra nsactions but it is costly to some ex tent a nd widely spread use of such services will r ender t h e p ro cess much more clumsy. It might in particular also hurt communit y feelings a n d as a consequence crowd out the intrinsic motivation to report the r esu lts of t r a nsactions on which eBay as of now relies.
Where Will and Where Should e Bay Gofrom He re?
Bearing in m ind the lessons from the indirect evolutionary approach to trust in large tra nsactions' syst em s it is not a t all obvious that eBa y in its present form might be a sustain a ble success. Success may breed n ew su ccess, t hou gh, in t h a t t h e present platform may d ev elop into a n ew, diffe rent one in ways d ep en dend on the stage already r eached on the d evelopment path. It seems cent r al t o inquire whether or n ot good conduct can be evolutionarily st able in t he env iron ment created by eBay. Our skepticism may be due to our outsider point of v iew but we would certainly be less skeptical if some of the following issues could be dealt with convincingly:
• Is it possible to go beyond general propositions about reliabilit y a nd costs and to say something more specific about those reputation m echanisms that lead to evolutionarily stable positive population sh ares of trustwort hy individuals?
• If there is a population of basically trustworthy a nd trut hful individuals, can it be sustained under a counting type characterization of t rustwort hiness as buyer or seller that is public on the net?
• What are the relative merits of tolerant as compared to intolera nt reput ation mechanisms and is there an optimal degree of tolerance as well as of information about distance to thresholds of tolerance?
• Would weighing with the monetary value of transactions render counting type mechanisms more stable in some precise sense of evolutionary stability against subve rsion by strategic reputation building insmall d eals followed by 'hit and run'-exploitation whe neve r a big d eal com es u p?
Some mor e or less exp e rime ntal issu es:
• Can we d esign economic experime nts to identify how b ou nd edly r a tional individuals resp ond to differe nt forms of informa tion in p articular to counting type reputation?
• Ca n we present experimental evide nce tha t and why t h e inclusion of qualitative ("he is a good eBayer") assessments by the par ties into t he inform a tion vector as practiced by eBay is h elpful?
• Would the future availability of p ersonal pictures of transaction p artner s (and other forms of person alizing r elations) on t he n et affect b ehavior?
• Is it true that 'thicker' communication will further co-opera t ion in gene ral?
Of course, there h as b een quite a bit of expe rime nta t ion on eBay n otably by Karen Cook, Alvin Roth and Axel Ockenfels, C hris Snijders a n d, also m entioned h er e last but not least, by Toshio Yamagishi. For t h e pr esent d iscussion som e ofYamagishi's work (see 2002) seems to b e particularly relevant. His theoretical argument tha t positive reputa tion in a n op en system may be su perior to n egative reputation over the lon g ha ul seems to be quite convincing. It sh ou ld h owever also b e fac ta red in tha t reputa tion building affor ds n o guarantee t h at p ositive r eputations can not b e strategically manipulated and sold. In particular if oper a tions b ecom e m ore globalized there ma y b e quit e som e effor ts to ch eat along tha t dimension. Whether in the e nd we w ill reach a k ind of global eBay tha t would extend auctions to global levels as some m ight hop e seem s open to serious d oubt. It seem s r ather likely tha t the re will b e countervailing forces t h a t would threaten the evolutionary sta bility of su ch a set u p.
